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ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the impact of restructuring processes on the organizational structure and 
lobbying strategies of women’s movement organizations (WMOs) in Belgium (Flanders) and 
the UK (Scotland). We argue that devolution/federalization and the resultant creation of new, 
intermediary levels of governance offers a devolution/federalism advantage to WMOs. Multi-
level governance multiplies access points, allowing for accumulation of funds, limited forms 
of venue shopping and avoidance of veto players. Nevertheless, a set of push and pull factors 
draws WMOs towards the regional level thereby ‘abandoning the centre’. These changes are 
driven by centrifugal dynamics that characterise the processes of devolution and 
federalization in these cases. In the long run, these may erase the devolution/federalism 
advantage, and also pose questions about state-wide women’s citizenship and gender 
solidarity.  
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There is an established literature examining the impact of federal institutions on outcomes in 
terms of government, democracy, management of diversity, and public policy (Erk 2006). 
However, the central research question for feminist scholars has been the impact of different 
sorts of state architecture on activist women’s strategies to progress women-friendly public 
policies (Vickers 2010). In particular, attention is paid to the formal division of powers and 
policy terrains, and how variations in form affect the political opportunity structure within 
which women’s movement organisations (WMOs) stake claims, and the consequent impact 
on women’s status as citizens and on strategies for feminist engagement with the state. The 
concern is with “if and how federal mechanisms can be operated to achieve women-friendly 
outcomes” (Vickers 2011a: 259), studied in single cases (Haussman 2005) or comparatively 
(Bashevkin 1998, Vickers 2011b, 2010; Chappell 2002; Haussman et al. 2010).  
 
Feminist scholars debate the double face of federalism. Starting with the negative face: 
empirically, many federal systems are not only “welfare laggards” but also “gender equality 
laggards” as compared with their unitary counterparts (Vickers 2010). Feminists argue this is 
because of institutional fragmentation and the federal characteristics and logic of divided 
powers and multiple veto points. Multiple levels of government may weaken state capacity to 
enact and protect women’s rights and weaken the capacity of organized women, including 
feminists, to lobby effectively across multiple levels. Research suggests that meso levels may 
act as veto players using a federation’s division of authority to obstruct federal led reforms 
(Haussman 2005, Vickers 2010). Furthermore, jurisdictional overlaps and blurred boundaries 
may enable political elites to dodge policy responsibility for gender equality (Haussman 2005, 
Vickers 1994, Vickers 2010, Vickers 2011a,b). Rolling back gender equality policies or 
implementing policies which negatively impact on women’s lives by one government in a 
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federal state might incite others to follow the example, resulting in what federalism’s critics 
classify as the ‘race to the bottom’. 
 
The potential federalism advantage – or positive face of federalism - also rests upon the 
defining characteristics of federalism: those of vertical power divisions and multiple 
governance sites. Federal state architectures are premised to “offer choices that may be 
unavailable in more centralized polities” (Constatelos 2010: 477). In this scenario, positive 
competitive dynamics may be harnessed which lead to policy innovation at sub state level 
with multiple opportunities for policy learning and emulation both horizontally and vertically. 
These may give rise to a ‘race to the top’ in terms of progressive public policy. According to 
Vickers (2011b) this ‘federalism advantage’ is most easily realized in centralized, 
symmetrical federations.  
 
Feminist scholars taking a conditional approach point out that characteristics that result in 
negative effects of federalism in one case may, in other cases and circumstances, be positive. 
For example, Bashevkin (1998) argues that in economic and political ‘hard times’, WMOs 
and their policy agendas fare better in federal systems than in unitary systems because there is 
no overall veto player. Similarly, Chappell argues the interplay of different levels in federal 
systems can slow down or stymie radical efforts at one level to unravel progressive social 
policy in conservative times. This is particularly the case in symmetrical federations with 
strong networks of women’s policy agencies (Chappell 2001, Chappell 2002).  
 
Most literature to date has studied federal systems with crystallized state architectures. 
However, the sets of opportunities and constraints offered by newly federalizing or devolving 
states may be qualitatively different. As Chappell explains, political opportunity structures 
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and institutional dynamics vary over time and across cases, “the relationship between 
feminists and political institutions is both interactive and dynamic” (2002: 269). Periods of 
institutional (re) structuring are also double-faced from the perspective of WMOs. Whilst 
positive outcomes are not guaranteed, being included at a stage when structures and their 
underpinning values are (re) negotiated may enable feminists to ‘lock in’ progressive 
elements thus counteracting historic gender imbalances (Vickers 2010). Thus periods of 
change may present a momentum for new institutional arrangements to include new, 
previously marginalised, actors and perspectives, and to adopt and institutionalize policy 
innovations that promote gender equality.  
 
Devolving and federalising systems also have a negative face. They create potential learning 
costs associated with newness whereby key actors must familiarise themselves with new state 
architectures and emerging institutional logics.  When state restructuring is designed as 
political accommodation of territorial or ethnolinguistic identities, there are further costs and 
dilemmas for civil society actors. Groups need to position themselves vis-à-vis incentives to 
comply with the dominant territorial identities and territorial elites that may: squeeze the 
political space available for the organisation and expression of other sorts of identities  (Erk 
and Anderson 2009; Huysseune 2009; Rebouché and Fearon 2005); demand territorial loyalty 
at the expense of cross-border/cross-community solidarities (such as women’s movement 
solidarities) in return for recognition and possible influence; or view projects like gender 
equality as “undermining the coherence” of ethnolinguistic or territorial projects (Rebouché 
and Fearon 2005:163). Examples also abound where new arrangements, driven by 
ethnolingustic or peripheral nationalisms, “actually allow particular ethnonational groups to 
further their own sexist ideologies” under the guise of political and cultural accommodation 
and protection (Rebouché and Fearon 2005:164).  
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This article focuses on the implications for WMOs of the creation of new intermediary levels 
in processes of devolution or federalization. The central question is: When states devolve or 
federalize, how do WMOs reconfigure in order to address the new opportunities and 
constraints presented? To what extent do WMOs capitalize on the new institutional logics 
created by federalizing and devolving processes with regard to multi levels and what costs are 
incurred? We examine WMOs in two cases, Belgium and the UK, and focus on the regional 
levels of Flanders and Scotland.  
 
The next two sections set out the key features of state restructuring in the cases and the 
methods and data, the subsequent ones describe developments in Flanders and Scotland, and 
analyze the implications of the federalization and devolution for the organizational structure 
and repertoires of WMOs. 
 
STATE RESTRUCTURING AND SUBSEQUENT ARCHITECTURE 
 
Neither Belgium nor the UK is a classic federation. However each has recently undergone far-
reaching processes of federalization or devolution, making them interesting cases to study 
change. The current Belgian state architecture is distinctive in its double constituent state 
level structure. In order to accommodate ethnolingustic and territorial differences, territorial 
regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital Region) and linguistic communities (Dutch-, 
French- and German-speaking) were created (Van Dyck 1996). As a result of a series of 
federalising reforms from 1980-2001, the regions and communities gained extensive powers 
and policy competences (Swenden et al 2006; see table 1).  From 1995 onwards, the 
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communities and regions were enabled to create their own political and administrative 
institutions. Whilst the overall picture is one of substantial complexity and fragmentation, in 
the case of Flanders, the Flemish community and Flemish region are fused in a single set of 
institutions (Deschouwer 2005; 2009) responsible for most areas of social policy.  
 
Unlike Belgium, restructuring processes in the UK have not resulted in a formal federal 
structure but rather devolution through the creation of new parliaments and legislative 
assemblies for its minority nations of Scotland and Wales and the jurisdiction of Northern 
Ireland. As a ‘union state’ rather than a unitary state there is a tradition of territorial 
differentiation and devolution managed within an overall system of administrative 
standardisation (Mitchell 2006; Tierney 2009). With political devolution in the 1990s, 
substantial powers and responsibilities formally vested in the Westminster parliament were 
transferred to newly created elected bodies within individual home rule settlements (Hazel 
and Rawlings 2005; see table 2).  
 
Changes in state architecture are important, as they designate vertical and horizontal power 
allocation and impose new opportunities and constraints for civil society, including social 
movements, seeking access and influence in policy-making processes. Devolution in the 
Scottish case is by means of the ‘reserved powers model’, whereby specifically enumerated 
powers are retained by the Westminster government (Hazel and Rawlings 2005). In the case 
of Belgium, policy competencies transferred to the regions are specified in the constitution. 
While policy competencies are formally exclusive in most cases, in practice there are 
overlapping responsibilities between the levels.  
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The restructuring in both cases is characterised by asymmetry, creating in Scotland and 
Flanders powerful regional actors vis a vis other regions, and with strong centrifugal pressures 
which fuel political demands for ever greater powers to be transferred (Deschouwer 2005; 
Tierney 2009). In the case of the UK, the outcomes are also asymmetric with regards to the 
centre, which retains responsibility for a mix of residual UK-wide and English function.  
Thus, the dominant partner in the Union – England – continues to be governed from the centre 
(Jeffery 2009). 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Indicative Division of competencies between Belgian state and sub-state level 
 
Federal level Communities (Flemish, 
French, German) 
Regions (Brussels, 
Flanders, Wallonia) 
The major powers of the 
federal state are not 
explicitly listed in the 
constitution or in special 
majority laws. This means 
that in practice the 
residual powers belong to 
the federal level. Major 
policy competencies 
include: 
· most aspects of Justice  
· most aspects of Social 
security and labour law. 
· Monetary policy 
· Security and defence. 
· Civil law, including 
immigration and 
nationality  
· Foreign affairs. 
Person related matters: 
· Education. 
· Cultural matters (defence 
and promotion of 
language, arts, libraries, 
radio and television 
broadcasting, youth 
policy, leisure, tourism, 
etc). 
· ‘Personalized’ matters 
(health prevention policy, 
assistance to individuals, 
etc). 
· Youth justice 
 
Territorially bound 
matters: 
· Economic affairs 
(excluding monetary 
policy etc). 
· Employment policy. 
· Economic development 
and  planning  
· most aspects of transport 
· Agriculture 
· Environment (protection, 
waste policy). 
· Rural development and 
nature conservation  
· Housing. 
· Local and provincial 
authorities  
 
 Source: Deschouwer 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Table 2: Division of indicative competencies between UK state and Scottish sub-state 
level  
 
Central level  Devolved Level (Scotland) 
‘Reserved’ Matters as set out in Sch 5 of 
Scotland Act 1998. 
Includes: 
 
· Constitution 
· Foreign Affairs 
· Defence 
· Fiscal and monetary policy* 
· Immigration and Nationality 
· Employment legislation 
· most Energy matters 
· most commercial law 
· Equal opportunities ** 
· Abortion 
All policy areas not reserved to 
the UK government under Sch.5, 
including: 
 
· Health 
· Education and Training 
· Economic development 
· Justice and Home Affairs 
· Local Government 
· Social work 
· Housing 
· Environment 
· most aspects of transport 
· Agriculture, fisheries and 
forestry 
· sports and the arts 
*tax varying powers  
**Equal opportunities (as set out in  
the exceptions to the Reservations) Source: Hazel and Rawlings 2005  
 
The extensive restructuring of the Belgian and UK state architectures is primarily a political 
accommodation of territorially distinctive identities and communities (Deschouwer 2003, 
2009, Jeffrey 2009). However, such accommodation of territorial cleavages can, 
paradoxically, exacerbate centrifugal pressures by ‘entrench[ing], perpetuat[ing] and 
institutionali[zing] the very divisions [they are] designed to manage’ (Simeon 1995:257). In 
Belgium, Flanders is the driver behind centrifugal regionalism, calling for an end to fiscal and 
financial solidarity with its Francophone counterpart, the poorer post-industrial Walloon 
region. It promotes a model of “Flemish-style pragmatic” governance that is neo-liberal and 
managerialist (Huysseune 2009: 7). The centrifugal dynamics are of a different nature in the 
UK with Scotland stressing devolution as an expression of its greater attachment to social 
democracy and as a buffer to the neo-liberal reforms of successive central governments 
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(Keating 2010), but equally result in growing territorial identification and widespread public 
support for more autonomy (Tierney 2009).  
 
MAPPING WMOS IN FLANDERS AND SCOTLAND: METHODS AND DATA 
 
The focus of this exploratory comparative study is on WMOs that: are autonomous groups 
rather than integrated organisations such as women’s sections within political parties and 
trade unions or formal parts of the state’s women’s policy machinery i; function as umbrellas – 
coordinating member organisations’ activities and advocacy and aggregating their 
preferences; have a broadly progressive gender equality seeking agenda; and that are generic 
(in contrast to organisations focusing on particular issues, such as gender based violence). 
Thus the organisations selected are concerned with inserting gender perspectives across all 
policy areas (economic, social and political) and with generic gender equality policies 
(including equality legislation, gender mainstreaming policy instruments, quota provisions 
and so on).  
 
In Belgium/Flanders the selection was straightforward: the study comprises the two Flemish 
autonomous umbrella women’s organisations: Nederlandstalige vrouwenraad (NVR) and 
Vrouwen Overleg Komité (VOK). The former, NVR, is one of the two successors to the 
former pan-Belgium national women’s council (the other one being the francophone Conseil 
de femmes francophones de Belgique, CFFB). The latter, VOK, is a product of 1970s second 
wave feminism (Woodward and Mulier 1999). In addition, the newer Flemish women’s 
organization for migrant women Steunpunt allochtone meisjes en vrouwen (ELLA vzw) was 
interviewed (see table 3). Supplementary interviews were conducted for context with a 
representative of the federal women’s equality advisory committee Raad van de gelijke 
11 
 
kansen voor mannen en vrouwen, and a representative from one of the Francophone umbrella 
organisations, Comité de liaison de femmes (CLF). Eight interviews were carried out between 
summer 2010 and spring 2012 (see Appendix). 
 
For the UK/Scottish case, selection was trickier as there is not a direct comparator to the 
Belgian or Flemish women’s councils, given the fragmented and decentred character of the 
women’s movement (Bagguley 2002).  Scottish organisations (past and current) were selected 
that met most of the criteria outlined. Interviews were held in the summer and autumn of 2011 
with actors from two UK organisations, the Women’s National Commission (formerly the 
official UK women’s advisory body) and the UK Joint Committee on Women (through which 
UK WMOs participate in the European Women’s Lobby (EWL)); and five past and present 
Scottish umbrella organizations, Engender and its pre devolution predecessors (Scottish 
Convention of Women (SCOW), Scottish Joint Action Group (SJAG), Women’s Forum 
Scotland (WFS)), and the Scottish government sponsored advisory body, the Scottish 
Women’s Convention (SWN). In addition, supplementary interviews were conducted for 
context with representatives from two Scottish advocacy coalitions, the Scottish Women’s 
Budget Group (an off-shoot of Engender) and the Stop the Gap coalition, and with the 
English based UK organisation, the Centre for Women and Democracy (see table 4). A total 
of ten interviews were conductedii (see Appendix).  
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Table 3: The  Flemish WMOs and the governments/levels  they lobby 
 
• The Dutch-speaking Community and The Flemish Region are institutionally merged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Federal level 
 
in charge of: 
gender 
equality, and 
also justice, 
social 
security, civil 
law 
 
 
Sub-state level (Flanders),  
 
 
Community, in 
charge of: gender 
equality, and also 
education, cultural 
matters ‘personalized 
matters (health 
prevention, assistance 
to individuals); … 
 
 
Region, in charge of: gender 
equality, and also of economic 
affairs; employment policy; 
housing; … 
Dutch 
speaking*  
 Flanders*  Wallonia Brussels 
Capital 
Region 
ELLA vzw- Flemish 
migrant women’s 
organisation 
 X  X   
NVR – Flemish  
umbrella women’s 
organization 
(formerly part of 
Belgian Women’s 
Council) 
X X  X  X 
VOK- Flemish 
umbrella women’s 
organisation 
X X  X  X 
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Table 4: The UK/ Scottish WMOs and the governments/levels they lobby 
 
 Central UK 
level 
In charge: of 
gender equality, 
social security and 
benefits, macro 
economic policy, 
employment law, 
equality law, 
asylum and 
immigration, 
abortion… 
Scottish level 
In charge: of 
gender 
equality*; and 
also most 
social policy 
areas including 
health, 
education, 
housing, civil 
and criminal 
law… 
European 
level 
In charge: of 
gender equality; 
single market 
and services; 
employment 
policy, social 
affairs… 
International 
In charge: of 
monitoring UK 
compliance with 
international 
conventions, eg 
CEDAW and 
obligations eg UN 
Platform for 
Action… 
Women’s 
National 
Commission 
(WNC) 
x x x x 
UK Joint 
Committee on 
Women 
(UKJCW) 
  x  
Engender (and its 
predecessors) 
x x x x 
Scottish Women’s 
Convention 
(SWC) 
 x   
* as set out in specific exceptions to the reservations ( Section 5 of the Scotland Act 1998) 
 
 
Interviews and documentary materials (organisational websites and literatureiii) were analysed 
across three themes: 1) How did organisations respond to state reconfiguration and 
devolving/federalising logics, and with what effect on their organisational structures and 
strategies? 2) How did WMOs understand new logics including divided powers, venue 
shopping and multi level games and what were the costs and benefits of playing new games? 
3) Does the experience to date of WMOs in these new systems suggest a federalism advantage 
or disadvantage?  
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BELGIUM - FLANDERS  
 
The universe of the women’s movement in Belgian is small: beyond the umbrella 
organisations studied, and integrated women’s sections connected to political parties and trade 
unions, most groups are based around single issues or are service oriented (Amazone et al. 
2002; Wiercx and Woodward 2004) iv. Prior to federalisation, women’s movement 
organisations came together in ad hoc alliances and through the Belgian National Women’s 
Council, the principal umbrella of women’s organisations, which played a coordinating role 
across language communities.  
 
From the late 1970s onwards, in parallel with ongoing processes of state reconfiguration and 
federalization, Belgian WMOs divided along the linguistic cleavage creating Flemish and 
Francophone organizations. This fragmentation and division was in line with broader trends 
that saw Belgian political parties, and other civil society actors and organisations, disbanding 
their state-wide structures and reconfiguring as Flemish or Francophone entities over this 
period. Newer WMOs were established as unilingual from the start, whilst longstanding 
WMOs, including the Belgian National Women’s Council, split into Dutch-speaking (NVR) 
and French-speaking  (CLF) organizations in 1979. 
 
Since then there has been no formal coordinating structure for WMOs to work at central level 
or across linguistic divides. The last remaining pan-Belgian structure, the federal women’s 
equality advisory committee (raad van de gelijke kansen voor mannen en vrouwen) serves as 
a committee of experts to the federal ministry. It is corporatist in composition drawing upon 
the social partners such as business, labour unions and professional bodies.v  Unlike the UK 
15 
 
WNC (see later), the committee plays no coordinating or integrative function for WMOs, nor 
does it have a representative role as the aggregator of WMO preferences.vi However, not 
withstanding the ongoing process of fragmentation, incentives remained for the linguistically 
divided WMOs to operate grosso modo in the still-unitary Belgium state at least until the 
creation of the communities and regions in the mid 1990s. There was only one government 
and one women’s policy machinery to lobby. Central state ministers were, and still are, 
responsive to demands from the WMOs. So, in order to be effective, especially when seeking 
to attract state funding, WMOs from both linguistic communities needed to join forces.vii  
 
The political landscape and institutional incentive structure was transformed in the mid 1990s, 
with the creation of new regional and community architectures. Along with substantial powers 
over most areas of social policy, Flanders also assumed responsibility for equal opportunities 
and created new gender equality architecture, including a women’s policy agency, to 
implement gender equality policies (Celis and Meier 2011; Hondeghem and Nelen 2000). 
Both the federal and the regional governments are now in charge of policy areas of central 
importance to WMOs, both have responsibility for aspects of equal opportunities and gender 
equality, both have women’s policy agencies, and both are sources of funding for WMOs.viii  
 
Federalisation – and the creation of the Flanders government as a new and powerful regional 
player - has provided new points of access regionally and has multiplied the opportunities for 
Flemish WMOs to lobby and influence policy and legislation. State reconfiguration has also 
opened up government to WMOs and the chance to participate in consultations and 
governance type arrangements. For example, the Flemish government is committed to gender 
mainstreaming as a policy approach and has systematically integrated the perspectives of 
WMOs in the development of policy over the past 15 years (Wiercx 2005). WMOs have 
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responded to the opportunity by, for example, producing expert policy briefings and analysis. 
Whilst recognising the dilemmas of co-option, WMOs nonetheless argue that such insider 
strategies have enhanced their influence on the regional government.ix 
 
Flemish WMOs have also responded to new institutional logics, including divided powers and 
multiple venues, with new strategies. According to the interviewees, WMOS are practiced at 
navigating the complex institutional arrangements and play multi level games, targeting their 
interventions at the most appropriate level for the policy in question in terms of lobbying 
politicians and officials, and tailoring advocacy communications to different audiences. For 
example, the NVR produces separate memoranda for the Flemish, Brussels, federal and 
European elections, with attention to the different policy competences and spheres of 
influence.x   
 
However, these multi-level strategies require a high level of professionalization and resources 
for WMOs and is therefore accessible only for larger organizations.xi Newer and smaller 
organisations argue that, without adequate staff and resources, they are squeezed out of multi-
level games. Consequently, organisations like ELLA vzw  - which promotes the agenda of 
migrant women – are required to prioritize Flanders as their primary domain of action in order 
to maximise their influence with the limited resources at their disposal: “At the federal level 
we are not known. If you want to influence policy making, you need a mandate, […] either 
because of your strength of numbers or because of your expertise. We have it based on 
expertise, but only in Flanders”.xii  
 
The new gender equality architecture opens up opportunities for Flemish WMOs to play 
multi-level funding games, and accumulate sponsorship from different levels of the Belgian 
17 
 
state. The Flemish umbrella organisations receive funds from both regional and federal 
government levels for their activities, and also – similar to their Francophone counterparts – 
from the Brussels government. There are different incentive structures: the federal level does, 
on occasion, incentivize cross community working or federal-regional joint funding; in some 
cases, regional governments only subsidize if another regional or community government also 
contributes, as in the case with some commemorative events such as the women’s march.xiii 
The Flemish government has over time become the most important source of funding for 
Flemish WMOs (Wiercx and Woodward 2004). This has further reduced the incentives for 
cross community working or organising at the federal level. 
 
UK – SCOTLAND 
 
Perhaps surprisingly there was not a dramatic reconfiguration of WMOs in response to 
changing state architecture in the UK as a result of devolution post 1999. Although there are a 
number of organizations with UK-wide remits and memberships, women’s groups have been 
organised primarily by sector (specialising in health, violence against women, etc) and/or on a 
territorial (sub-state nation) or local basis since the 1970s and the emergence of second wave 
feminism. In response to the institutions of administrative devolution that existed for many 
decades prior to political devolution, WMOs from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were 
already required to play multi level games; lobbying the Westminster parliament and 
government and their respective territorial ministries and administrations (Mackay 2010).  
 
Organisations from around the UK came together through ad hoc and time limited alliances 
around specific issues (Bagguley 2002), and also through membership of the Women’s 
National Commission (WNC). The WNC is the official all-UK umbrella structure, which 
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coordinates and represents the views of women’s organizations to central government. 
Comparatively speaking, it sits somewhere between the Belgian autonomous women’s 
councils and the Belgian women’s equality advisory committee in that, although staffed by 
civil servants and sponsored by government, since its restructuring as a non-departmental 
public body (NDPB) in 1998 it has autonomous lobbying and agenda setting roles. As well as 
providing a rare coordinating mechanism for a fragmented women’s sector (Squires 2007), an 
important plank of WNC work since the UK ratified the international women’s human rights 
instrument CEDAWxiv in 1986 has been to coordinate the UK NGO Shadow report to the UN 
monitoring Committeexv.  
 
In anticipation of devolution, new Scottish organizations such as Engender were created in the 
early 1990s to promote a generic feminist agenda, displacing or incorporating older 
organizations such as the Scottish Convention of Women (which lobbied at UK and Scottish 
level), the Scottish Joint Action Group (which worked at Scottish, UK and international 
level), and Women’s Forum Scotland (formed in the 1980s to engage with institutions of the 
European Union).  
 
Whilst some other UK wide interest groups and social movement organisations did create 
Scottish offices in the run up to devolution, or shortly thereafter, in order to be best placed to 
influence new levels of government, this was not the case for WMOs with UK wide remits. 
Neither did the WNC reconfigure immediately to take devolution into account, despite the 
longstanding grievances of Scottish WMOs (and those from Wales and Northern Ireland) 
about the lack of attention paid to territorial differences by the WNC.xvi This reflects the 
general pattern of adhoc and uncoordinated response to devolution in the UK by government, 
political parties, public bodies, and civil society alike (Jeffreys 2009). 
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The gender equality architecture of the UK underwent significant change as a result, firstly, of 
the return to power of a social democratic government in 1997 and, secondly, devolution. 
Prior to this, the UK was comparatively unusual because it lacked a formal women’s or 
equality policy machinery structure inside government.xvii Following on from the creation in 
1997 of a Women’s Unit (now the Government Equalities Office, GEO) inside the UK 
government, each devolved administration created its own equalities policy machinery located 
within government, which consults with equalities organizations, including WMOs.  
 
As in Belgium, both central and regional levels are charged with policy responsibilities in 
areas of priority for equality-seeking WMOs. Both state levels have specialist policy agencies 
with responsibilities for gender equality policies (McLaughlin 2007). Entities at both levels 
can sponsor WMOs and their activities, although in contrast to Belgium, UK central 
government has not been a significant source of funding for WMOs pre or post devolution; 
rather WMOs have been more likely to be locally funded through grants or service contracts 
from local authorities, public bodies, and charities, or through European Union project 
funding.xviii 
 
These developments have changed the policy and political landscape for WMOs and would 
seem to make multi-level games inescapable. However, taking advantage of this changed state 
architecture requires a multi-level strategy that is resource intensive. Unlike their Flemish 
counterparts, Scottish WMOs have not systematically addressed both levels of government. 
Although they have utilised the multiple new access points and mechanisms offered by the 
Scottish parliament and government (Mackay et al 2005), they have been relatively absent 
from the UK level arena, undertaking very little direct lobbying of central government 
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departments, the GEO or Westminster on reserved matters, and responding on an ad hoc basis 
to UK level consultations.xix Neither do UK WMOs report routinely lobbying or engaging 
with the devolved levels of government.xx 
 
Unlike their Belgian counterparts Scottish WMOs have not strategized to accumulate funding 
across levels, in part because of limited incentives.xxi Devolution has, however, created 
greater access to state funding at the Scottish level. Although modest, the regional Equality 
Unit now provides funding for some of Engender’s core costs. In addition, the Scottish 
government sponsors a new umbrella organization, the Scottish Women’s Convention (SWC), 
set up in 2003 (initially under the auspices of Engender) with the remit to “communicate and 
consult with women in Scotland to influence public policy”.xxii 
 
Restructuring has created multiple new points of access and enhanced opportunities for 
WMOs in Scotland to lobby and be consulted about developments in public policy and 
legislation. WMOs have promoted gender mainstreaming and the inclusion of gender 
perspectives in the Scottish budget process and spending plans (McKay et al, 2002), lobbied 
the parliament to use its powers to impose general equality duties on public bodies 
(Georghiou and Kidner 2007), secured improvements in public appointments processes, and 
influenced the development of a progressive national strategy to end violence against women, 
amongst other issues (Mackay 2010).  
 
Although WMOs in Scotland have withdrawn from substantial engagement at UK level, 
Scottish WMOs have continued and intensified their engagement with the european and 
international levels. For example, Scottish WMOs participate along with Northern Irish, 
Welsh and English umbrella bodies in the EWL through The UK Joint Committee on Women 
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(UKJCW)xxiii The UKJCW has enabled Scottish WMOs to play an equal role with those from 
the other jurisdictions in reaching consensus positions to promote in Europe, thus maximising 
influence at this level. However, it is notable as a coordinating structure in both its rarity and 
its attentiveness to territorial identities.xxiv 
 
DISCUSSION: MULI-LEVEL POLITICS AND CENTRIFUGAL DYNAMICS 
WMOs have reconfigured in order to address the opportunities and constraints presented by 
new institutions and gender equality architecture. In both Flanders and Scotland they have 
capitalized, to an extent, on the new institutional logics created by federalizing and devolving 
processes with regard to multi levels, divided powers, and the opportunities for venue 
shopping. There has been an increase in access points creating an apparent federal or 
devolution ‘advantage’ with multiple new links to more proximate and accessible levels of 
government, in addition to those already existing at the centre.  
 
Many of the issues crucial to the lessening of gender inequality (feminization of poverty, 
gender based violence, gendered pay gaps and occupational segregation, work-life balance, 
under representation of women in political and public life etc.) are addressed by more than 
one level or domain of government and require horizontal and vertical action. This implies the 
need for WMOs to play multi-level games. Studying these thus sheds light on what 
institutional arrangements and changing political contexts mean. 
 
Playing multi level games in respect of addressing both the regional and federal levels is most 
evident in the case of Belgium. Flemish WMOs engage with both levels of government to 
lobby and maximise funding; they are able to cash the federalism advantage by accumulating 
subsidies from plural governmentsxxv, thereby avoiding veto players. This is markedly less the 
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case in Scotland: Scottish WMOs have not systematically addressed both levels of 
government. Although they have utilized the multiple new venues offered by the Scottish 
parliament and government to impact upon Scottish politics and policies, they have been 
relatively absent from the UK level arena.  
 
In contexts where policy competences and regulatory powers are divided between regions and 
the centre rather than shared, strategies of (vertical) venue shopping or level hopping are 
somewhat limited.  Furthermore, opportunities for horizontal shopping (or defection) are 
circumscribed, given the strong territorial – and, in the case of Belgium, ethnolinguistic- 
identities that have driven federalization/devolution.  
 
However, in describing their practice, it is clear that that Flemish WMOs work with the logic 
of the multi-level system to reframe issues and pursue different aspects of the same broad 
policy agenda. If they meet a block at one level, they will adapt their agendas to pursue other 
more accessible policy goals.xxvi  
 
Scottish WMOs venue shop in the sense that they reframe some reserved issues as devolved, 
or they lobby for the devolved level to mitigate the worst effects of UK policies, such as 
economic cuts and deficit reduction policies. For example, rather than lobby the current UK 
Conservative Liberal Democrat Coalition government about its refusal to implement various 
parts of the 2010 Equality Act (passed by the former UK Labour administration), Scottish 
WMOs and their allies have instead focussed upon strengthening the operation of the 
legislation by means of the Scottish ‘specific duties’ which lie within the jurisdiction of the 
Scottish parliament and government.xxvii  
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Scottish WMOs have not entirely eschewed multi-level games but they play them beyond the 
state. They aim to influence the UK government internationally through the CEDAW 
reporting processes (through the WNC and autonomously through their ECOSOCxxviii status 
and the submission of their own Shadow reports), for example on issues of funding and 
coordination mechanisms, and via Europe (through the EWL), for example, on issues of 
violence against women, and trafficking.xxix Thus they adopt classic transnational social 
movement strategies of boomerang or venue hopping (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Whilst the 
Scottish organisation Engender places engagement at European and international levels as a 
key dimension of its activities,xxx these strategies are do not feature prominently in the 
repertoire of their Flemish counterparts.  
 
The study suggests that new, fluid structures provide different opportunities and constraints 
and present different logics to those of long-crystallised federations. Scottish WMOs played a 
more active role than their Flemish counterparts in the processes leading up to 
devolution/federalisation, as part of a wider mobilisation of civil society (Brown et al. 2002). 
In both cases, however, issues of women’s political participation and claims for gender 
equality became coupled with political aspirations for self-determination. WMOs and gender 
equality agenda were thus part of the ‘winning coalitions’ in each case. As such, progressive 
gender policies have served as ‘shorthand’ for symbolising the aims of each new polity to 
present themselves as modern, inclusive and relevant.  
 
In the case of Scotland gender equality was part of the dominant politics of the centre-left and 
discourses of ‘new politics’ embodying values of accountability, openness and participation, 
power-sharing and equal opportunities (Mackay et al 2003). In the case of Flanders the then-
innovative gender mainstreaming approach was introduced as part of the regionalist discourse 
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of a Flemish style of efficient modern governance (Celis and Meier 2010), opening up the 
policy-process to WMOs as ‘partners’ and experts. This counter intuitively has resulted in 
Flanders, where traditionally the Christian-democratic party is dominant, having more 
progressive gender equality policies than Wallonia where the more leftist Social-democratic 
party dominates government coalitions; and the meso level in both Scotland and Belgium 
being more open to WMOs and more progressive than their respective centres.  
 
But processes of restructuring also present new costs and dilemmas. For example, over and 
above the classic costs of playing multiple levels, there are transitional costs. In both Flanders 
and Scotland, changes in state architecture have created considerable coordination and 
learning costs in terms of grasping how to work with a new set of institutions at regional 
level, and working at central as well as regional level. As one Scottish interviewee put it, “For 
the first few years of devolution we had our heads down focussing on the Scottish parliament 
and government – we didn’t look up - […] things were changing so fast and we struggled to 
keep other connections alive.”xxxi 
 
The most striking findings of the study are the centrifugal dynamics which encourage WMOs 
to ‘abandon the centre’ in preference for the new regional arenas. In the thirteen years since 
devolution there has been little coordinated action at UK level involving WMOs from 
Scotland or the other devolved jurisdictions, with the exception of limited joint engagement 
around violence against women and women’s political representation. All interviewees, from 
both Scottish and English-UK organisations, observed that Scottish WMOs had become 
‘disassociated’ from the UK level and had let a vacuum develop around joint interests in 
reserved matters and possibilities for joint working around devolved issues.xxxii  
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There are a number of push and pull factors which help to explain the phenomenon, which is 
most marked in the case of Scotland but also increasingly evident for Flanders. On the push 
side: in each case the centre is characterized as problematic for territorially-based WMOs. 
The difficulties relate both to formal state architecture and the political dynamics and 
relationships between centre and region but, in each case, add up to centrifugal pressures that 
create disincentives for WMOs to engage with the centre or to co-ordinate with WMOs across 
communities or levels. 
 
The UK centre is monopolized by the numerically, economically and politically dominant 
partner in the Union – England – which continues to be governed from the centre and is 
largely unaffected by devolution. Scottish WMOs report widespread ignorance and 
indifference to devolution – and the distinctive territorial perspectives and views it may 
generate- by the UK GEO, other UK government departments, and English/UK women’s 
organizations: “They don’t know how to deal with the UK-ness of the UK post-devolution, 
and they don’t see devolution and the devolved jurisdictions as their concern.”xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxvi
 According 
to Scottish interviewees, interventions from the periphery would have limited impact on the 
UK process, “there is little sense that our additional commentary is welcome.”  It was 
argued that contributions about distinctiveness or divergence from the centre were viewed as 
irrelevant or having little by way of transferability to the English or UK policy context by 
both government and UK/English WMOs. Thus there are ever fewer incentives to incur the 
costs necessary in order to engage with the centre and the WMOs who inhabit the political 
space at the centre.xxxv This confirms that for WMOs as for other regional actors in 
asymmetric structures, the price of devolution is loss of influence at the centre.  
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These centrifugal tendencies have been exacerbated by the paucity of coordinating structures 
(either government led or autonomous). In particular, the UK Coalition government’s decision 
to abolish the WNC as part of its cost-cutting exercises in 2010/11 has left a structural gap 
and leaves the UK women’s sector without a coordinating structure across the four nations or 
a formal voice to central government. Although the WNC had been slow to respond to the 
changed landscape, it had formally adopted a four-nations approach in 2008, including 
appointing Commissioners with specific remits for the devolved jurisdictions, and specific 
budgets (WNC 2010:14) xxxvii. Although interviewees reported improved responsiveness to 
territorial perspectives, there was too little
xxxviii
 time for effective coordination to be developed 
before the organization was abolished.  The abolition of the WNC also removes the 
central mechanism for reaching consensus on a UK NGO Shadow Report to CEDAW.  
 
Whereas the UK centre might be characterized as powerful, indifferent and crowded, the 
Belgian centre is described increasingly as weak, ineffectual and ‘empty’. Deschouwer 
(2005:97) argues ongoing processes of Belgian federalization – and the accompanying 
territorialisation and fragmentation of formerly state wide political parties and other political 
players - has “institutionaliz[ed] the inability to make decisions” at the centre. Furthermore, 
there are few political incentives for political actors to form bridges across the ethno-linguistic 
divide or to govern Belgium as a unified state. The resulting paralysis – for example the 
prolonged crisis of 2010-11 when parties failed to agree a governing coalition after the 2010 
federal elections -has resulted in an “‘emptying’ of centralised political power” and the 
disappearing of the political centre. This study demonstrates these disintegrative pressures are 
also evident amongst civil society organisations like WMOs; incentives to engage with the 
federal level or across community have dissipated in the absence of a full functioning centre 
or any pan Belgian coordinating mechanisms or structures.  
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The federalising and devolving processes also have an impact on WMOs with levels beyond 
the federal. Whereas organising around international institutions such as the European 
Women’s Lobby (EWL) or CEDAW reporting provides a spur for Scottish WMOs to work 
with other devolved nations and with the English/UK centre, no such incentive exists for 
Flemish WMOs and their Francophone counterparts. Counter intuitively, perhaps, WMOs 
have little motivation to work on consensus positions. The Belgian place on the European 
Women’s lobby is rotated between NVR and its Francophone counterpart (CFFB). However, 
when consensus is impossible, the different WMOs simply submit separate standpoints to the 
EWL. In the case of shadow reporting on CEDAW, which is given high priority in 
UK/Scotland , the Flemish – and Francophone – WMOs have taken the comparatively 
unusual decision to opt out of these autonomous processes. Instead they contribute to their 
respective regional government’s input into the official Belgian state report to CEDAW, thus 
negating the necessity to engage with WMOs from other communitiesxxxix. 
 
The increased orientation of WMOs in Scotland and Flanders towards their territorial 
governments is furthered by important pull factors: the ease of cooperation within the region 
(including, in the case of Scotland, long established networks), and  the ongoing downloading 
of many policy competences that are also crucially important to women’s lives like health, 
housing, education, childcare, economic development and social welfare services. The 
establishment of women’s or equality policy machinery and equality policies by the new 
Flemish and Scottish government provide conducive contexts for lobbying and collaboration.  
In the case of wealthy Flanders, generous state provision of financial resources attracts 
WMOs. In the case of Scotland, the relative precariousness of funding at all levels forces 
women’s organizations to be selective about which level to address. Scottish and some 
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Flemish WMOs argue that they have chosen to concentrate energies at the level at which they 
have most potential scope for influencing policy in terms of both proximity and access.xl 
 
To be sure, there are positive outcomes from this regional focus, including close linkages and 
the good potential for influence. However such alignments have a more negative face. An 
observed trend in Flanders, although not yet in evidence in Scotland, is that regional 
governments can and sometimes do act as veto players demanding exclusivity of project 
funding or territorial focus.
xliii
xli Increasingly, too, interviewees observe that, since the Flemish 
government has become their major sponsor, it requires a “return on its investment” from 
Flemish WMOs.xlii In particular, there is increased scrutiny of regionally sponsored 
organisations to ensure they do not spend “disproportionate” time on federal matters.  
 
Over reliance on one level brings with it other potential pitfalls including co-option. This is 
particularly so for the professionalized and institutionalized Flemish organizations: “we lose 
the ownership of our work”xliv. Many of the issues crucial to the lessening of gender 
inequality are addressed by more than one level or domain of government and require 
horizontal and vertical action. However, there is the increasing danger that regional WMOs 
neglect important policy domains still charged to the centre: leaving issues unaddressed in an 
‘empty’ centre, as in Belgium; or, leaving English (nominally UK) organizations to speak for 
UK women on reserved matters, which Scottish WMOs perceive they do so from a 
perspective that is inattentive to the territorial interests and contexts beyond the centre.xlv  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article analyzes the impact of restructuring processes on the organizational structures and 
lobbying strategies of women’s organizations in Belgium (Flanders) and the UK (Scotland). 
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In answer to the question: have the processes of devolution and federalisation been 
advantageous for the Flemish and Scottish women’s movements; the picture is mixed. The 
findings tend to confirm the ‘conditional approach’ (Chappell 2002), emphasizing the ways in 
which particular institutional arrangements interact with specific social and political contexts. 
We argue that devolution/federalization and the resultant creation of new, intermediary levels 
of governance offer a devolution/federalism advantage to WMOs. Multi level governance 
multiplies access points, allowing for accumulation of funds, limited forms of venue shopping 
and avoidance of veto players.  
 
New institutions provide qualitatively different opportunities and constraints to those offered 
by crystallised federations, and this exploratory study points to distinctive costs, dilemmas 
and logics that emerge in these fluid contexts. In particular, a set of push and pull factors has 
drawn WMOs towards the regional level thereby ‘abandoning the centre’.  
 
The wider literature suggests that restructuring driven by ethnolingustic or peripheral 
nationalism has negative consequences for gender equality and constrains the potential 
political space in which WMOs can organise and campaign. However, the findings suggest 
the need to adopt a ‘conditional approach’ on this question, too: outcomes are dependent upon 
particular institutional configurations and relations between WMOs and political institutions. 
In conditions where WMOs are well connected with regional political elites; where gender 
equality is a goal congruent with regionalist and/ or nationalist aspirations; and where access 
to policymaking for WMOs is facilitated by technocratic (in the case of Flanders) or 
democratic (in the case of Scotland) discourses, the lure of the regional level is strong. 
 
30 
 
Nonetheless, in the case of both Flanders and Scotland, centrifugal dynamics appear to 
diminish the potential for policy learning and joint working vertically across levels and 
horizontally across jurisdictions. This reduces the likelihood that federalization/devolution 
will fuel a ‘race to the top’ across the wider polity with respect of gender equality.  
 
Furthermore, if these trajectories persist the likely outcome is that any devolution or 
federalism advantage arising from multi-level interactions will dissipate as WMOs choose – 
or are forced – to operate at just one level. In such scenarios, the veto potential of the regional 
level increases. Moreover, the leverage of territorially-based WMOs is reduced on many 
issues (such taxation and social security, macro economic policy, immigration and nationality 
policy, and abortion) that are of crucial importance to campaigns for gender equality (and its 
intersection with other dimensions of inequality such as race) and that are still assigned to the 
centre.  
 
The fragmentation of WMOs and centrifugal dynamics of territorialization also raise 
questions about the implication of devolution and federalism for statewide women’s 
citizenship and broader concerns about gender solidarity (Mackay 2010). In other words, 
territorial identity might trump gender identity and lead to territorially differentiated and 
distinctive gendered citizenship in the different parts of the UK and Belgium. This is indeed 
the concern of one of the francophone Belgian interviewees: 
 “What is the essential identity of feminists? It is fighting patriarchy! And that 
patriarchy is identical at both sides! But that is not how the story will go. We will end 
up by saying ‘I prefer the Flemish patriarchy above the Walloon patriarchy’.”xlvi 
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Appendix: List of interviews 
Belgium: 
Interview 1: 25/6/2010, Ghent, VOK 
Interview 2: 28/6/2010, Brussels, NVR 
Interview 3: 13/7/2010, Antwerp, ELLA vzw  
Interview 4: 14/9/2011, Brussels, NVR 
Interview 5: 17/4/2012, Brussels, NVR 
Interview 6: 18/4/2012, Brussels, NVR 
Interview 7: 18/4/2012, Brussels, Raad van de gelijke kansen voor Mannen en Vrouwen 
Interview 8:  2/7/2010, Brussels, CFFB 
UK: 
Interview 1:  30/8/2011, Leeds, Centre for Women and Democracy,  
Interview 2:  30/8/2011, Edinburgh, Engender, SWC  
Interview 3:  31/8/2011, Glasgow, WNC 
Interview 4:  31/8/2011, Edinburgh, SWC  
Interview 5:  31/8/2011, Edinburgh, SCOW, SJAG, WFS, Engender, WNC 
Interview 6:  1/9/2011, Edinburgh, Engender, UKJCW, WNC  
Interview 7:  1/9/2011, Glasgow, Close the Gap 
Interview 8:  1/9/2011, Glasgow, Engender, UKJCW 
Interview 9:  1/9/2011, Glasgow, Scottish Women’s Budget Group 
Interview 10: 4/11/2011, London, WNC 
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i Political and bureaucratic state institutions promoting gender equality, See Stetson and Mazur (1995) for fuller 
definitions. 
ii Some individuals represented more than one organization, some organizations were represented by more than 
one interviewee. 
iii Flemish WMOs  produce little written or web-based material, most of it of an administrative or service 
oriented nature. Therefore the Flemish analysis is based primarily on interview data.  
iv For an overview see 
http://www.rosadoc.be/joomla/index.php/vrouwenbeweging/vrouwenbeweging/organigram.html 
v http://www.raadvandegelijkekansen.be 
vi BELG Interview 7 
vii BELG Interview 1, 2, 4. 
viii BELG Interview 1, 4, 5, 6  
ix BELG Interview 2. 
x BELG Interview 2; for the memoranda see: http://www.vrouwenraad.be/p_80.htm  
xi BELG Interview 1; see also Wiercx 2005. 
xii BELG Interview 3. 
xiii BELG Interview 1. 
xiv UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
xv States that have ratified CEDAW are committed to submit national reports, at least every four years, detailing 
the progress made to comply with their treaty obligations. NGOs participate in a shadow process, usually 
producing an independent report for the UN CEDAW Monitoring committee. 
xvi UK Interviews 3, 5. 
xvii The GB Equal Opportunities Commission (and its successor the Equality and Human Rights Commission) 
are  public bodies at arms-length to government. 
xviii http://www.wrc.org.uk/includes/documents/cm_docs/2011/w/ww_anthology_final_2011.pdf 
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xix UK Interviews 2,5,6,8,9. See also, for example, Engender annual reports at http://www.engender.org.uk; SWC 
annual report 2011 at 
http://www.scottishwomensconvention.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Annual%20Report%202011.pdf  
xx UK Interviews 1, 2,10. 
xxi UK Interview 2 
xxii http://www.scottishwomensconvention.org/about.asp 
xxiii An all-UK co-ordinating body comprising four regional umbrella organizations, each taking turns to lead 
UKJWC and represent the UK at EWL. 
xxiv UK Interviews 6, 8. 
xxv BELG Interview 3 
xxvi BELG Interview 2. 
xxvii UK Interviews 3, 4, 7. 
xxviii As NGOs with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council  
xxix UK Interviews 2, 6, 7. 
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